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Chapter I
The Classical Publicists
To facilitate an understanding of the historical development of the con-cept of the right of forcible protection, the earliest publicists are denomi-
nated herein as the “classical” writers. This group, spanning the Seventeenth
and Eighteenth Centuries include Grotius, Wolff and Vattel. During this his-
torical period the European State system assumed a preeminent position in the
world.
A. Grotius. Grotius, the “father of international law,” developed two funda-
mental principles that have influenced much of the later thinking on the sub-
ject of the protection of the lives and property of nationals abroad.
First, he maintained that a sovereign’s concern for his subjects must be para-
mount. “[T]he first and particularly necessary concern,” argued Grotius, “is for
subjects, either those who are subject to authority in a family, or those who are
subject to a political authority.”1
Second, Grotius contended that under the law of nations there existed a
principle that “for what any civil society, or its head, ought to finish . . . by not
fulfilling the law, for all this there are held and made liable all the corporeal or
incorporeal possessions of those who are subject to such a society or its head.”2
Grotius viewed this latter principle, which countenanced collective responsi-
bility, as pragmatic, the “outgrowth of a certain necessity, because otherwise a
great license to cause injury would arise.”3
As a corollary to this forerunner of State responsibility, Grotius considered
at least two remedial measures open to the protecting sovereign: the “seizure of
persons” and the “seizure of goods.” As to the former, Grotius cited the practice
of the ancient Greeks, in the form of Attican law which stated: “If anyone die
T:\Academic\Blue Book\Lillich\Ventura Files\Lillich Blue Book Vol 77.vp
Monday, July 29, 2002 10:53:16 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
by a violent death, for his sake, it shall be right for his relatives and next of kin
to proceed to apprehend men, until either the penalty has been paid for the
murder, or the murderers are given up.”4 Grotius extended this approach to
justify a sovereign’s resort to self-help to protect his subjects from potential in-
jury, stating that “there is nothing in this that is repugnant to nature, and it is
the practice not only of the Greeks, but of other nations also.”5
Grotius also discussed briefly “the right of detention of citizens of another
state in which a manifest wrong has been done to a national, in order to secure
his recovery.”6 While admitting the existence of such a right, Grotius never-
theless rejected its utility. In this regard, he described the reasons advanced
against the seizure of Ariston of Tyre by the Carthaginians. The principal argu-
ment was that if Ariston were seized “(th)e same thing will happen to
Carthaginians both at Tyre and in the other commercial centers to which they
go in large numbers.”7
With reference to the “seizure of goods,” Grotius’ second remedial measure,
he cited, without discussion, the “withernam” of the Saxons and Angles and
the “letters of marque” authorized by the King of France.8 Additionally, he
pointed to Homer’s description in the Iliad of Nestor’s seizure of “the flocks
and herds of the men of Elis in revenge for the horses stolen from his father.”9
Finally, Grotius recounted an instance from Roman history in which
Aristodemus, the heir of the Tarquins, held Roman ships at Cumae as compen-
sation for Tarquin property seized by the Romans.10
For Grotius, the sovereign’s right to use self-help to protect his subjects was a
far-reaching one, justifying resort to force. As he put it: “Seizure by violence
may be understood to be warranted not only in case a judgment cannot be ob-
tained against a criminal or a debtor within a reasonable time, but also if in a
very clear case (for in a doubtful case the presumption is in favor of those who
have been chosen by the state to render judgment) judgment has been ren-
dered in a way manifestly contrary to law; for the authority of the judge has not
the same force over foreigners as over subjects.”11
However, such resort to force did not include the taking of life. According to
the “law of love,” “particularly for Christians, the life of a man ought to be of
greater value than our property. . . .”12
Thus, although Grotius did not directly address the question of the protec-
tion of the lives and property of nationals abroad, he did adopt certain premises
that influenced subsequent writers in the development of theoretical justifica-
tions for such protection. Subsequent to Grotius, the importance of the citizen
to the sovereign, as well as the recognition of the right of a sovereign to protect
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a citizen, by force if necessary, became recurrent themes in the literature on
this subject.
B. Wolff. Wolff, writing in the mid-Eighteenth Century, elaborated upon the
duty of a nation to preserve itself, a topic that had also been considered earlier
by Grotius. “Every nation is bound to preserve itself,” wrote Wolff, “for the men
who make a nation, when they have united into a state, are as individuals
bound to the whole for promoting the common good, and the whole is bound to
the individuals to provide for them those things which are required as a compe-
tency for life, for peace and security.”13 Thus, although Wolff did not expressly
mention the protection of nationals abroad, it can be inferred that, to the ex-
tent that such protection was required “as a competency for life, for peace and
security,” he believed that a State was obliged to extend its protection to its na-
tionals abroad.
Moreover, Wolff recognized as valid the use of force to enforce a State’s rights.
“The right belongs to every nation to obtain its right against another nation
by force, if the other is unwilling to allow that right. For the right belongs to ev-
ery nation not to permit any other nation to take away its right, consequently
also not to permit it not to allow that right. Therefore it is necessary, when one
does not wish to allow a right, that the other compel it by force to allow it.
Therefore the right belongs to the one nation against the other nation to obtain
its right by force, if the other does not wish to allow it.”14
Indeed, a State had the right to defend itself and its rights against another
State15 and to punish another State, by force, which had injured it.16 Thus, the
forcible protection of nationals abroad can be brought under either of these
concepts, especially the latter, without much difficulty.
C. Vattel. The first writer to focus directly upon the protection of nationals
abroad was Vattel. Amplifying Grotius’ concern for the citizen, as well as his
justification for a State’s enforcement of its rights against another State, Vattel
argued that:
Whoever offends the State, injures its rights, disturbs its tranquillity, or does it a
prejudice in any manner whatsoever, declares himself its enemy, and exposes
himself to be justly punished for it. Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly offends
the state, which is bound to protect this citizen; and the sovereign of the latter
should avenge his wrongs, punish the aggressor, and, if possible, oblige him to
make full reparation; since otherwise the citizen would not obtain the great end
of the civil association, which is, safety.17
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Thus, building upon the Grotian premise that a State has a right to protect
its citizens, Vattel argued that forcible protection not only was justified, but
that it was an obligation owed by States to their citizens.
To illustrate the breadth of the principle of protection, Vattel used several
hypothetical and real examples. For instance, “[t]he sovereign who refuses to
cause reparation to be made for the damage done by his subject, or to punish
the offender, or, finally, to deliver him up, renders himself in some measure an
accomplice in the injury, and becomes responsible for it.”18 Vattel cited the ex-
ample of King Demetrius’ imputed responsibility for the murder of a Roman
ambassador by one of the King’s subjects in this regard.19 In that case, after
King Demetrius delivered the guilty persons to Rome for appropriate punish-
ment, the Roman Senate sent them back, “resolving to reserve to themselves
the liberty of punishing that crime, by avenging it on the King himself, or on his
dominions.”20 It is interesting to note that Vattel, although agreeing that the
King ultimately was responsible for the acts of his subject, found the Senate’s
conduct unjust, as appropriate reparation had been offered by sending the
guilty persons to Rome. Vattel’s analysis of this incident, applicable to many of
the instances of forcible protection described herein, was that the Senate’s de-
cision was “but a pretext to cover their ambitious enterprises.”21
Another instance, described by Vattel, where forcible protection may be ex-
ercised is when a State “accustoms and authorizes its citizens indiscriminately
to plunder and maltreat foreigners. . . .”22 In the face of such a situation, “all na-
tions have a right to enter into a league against such a people, to repress them,
and to treat them as the common enemies of the human race.”23 As instances
of this use of the principle of protection, Vattel cited the “guilt” of the nation of
the Usbecks for the robberies its citizens had committed, as well as the hypo-
thetical justification for a Christian confederacy against the Barbary States, “in
order to destroy those haunts of pirates, with whom the love of plunder, or the
fear of just punishment, is the only rule of peace and war.”24
Vattel’s seeming endorsement of a broad right of forcible protection was
tempered somewhat by his concern with the concept of sovereignty. “We
should not only refrain from usurping the territory of others,” argued Vattel,
“we should also respect and abstain from every act contrary to the rights of the
sovereign. . . . We cannot, then, without doing an injury to a state, enter its ter-
ritories with force and arms. . . . This would at once be a violation of the safety
of the state, and a trespass on the rights of empire or supreme authority vested
in the sovereign.”25 Thus, “[t]he prince . . . ought not to interfere in the causes
of his subjects in foreign countries, and grant them his protection, excepting in
cases where justice is refused, or palpable and evident injustice done, or rules
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and forms openly violated, or, finally, an odious distinction made, to the preju-
dice of his subjects, or of foreigners in general.”26
Being the first of the classical international law writers to expressly discuss
the protection of nationals abroad, Vattel’s analysis is not particularly
far-reaching. The right to protection that he initially developed is qualified by
his later emphasis on the rights of the sovereign. The fact remains, however,
that Vattel recognized a State’s right (obligation) to forcibly protect its citizens
abroad by avenging the wrongs done to them and punishing their aggressors, at
least in cases of flagrant injustice.27
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